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Sheppard v. Early
168 F.3d 689 (4th Cir. 1999)
In Sheppard v. Early,1 Mark Sheppard ("Sheppard"), a death row inmate
in Virginia, brought a federal action challenging the constitutionality of
section 53.1-232.1 of the Virginia Code.2 The statute requires a trial court
which has imposed a death sentence to hold a hearing for the purpose of
setting an execution date within ten days of receiving written notice from
the Attorney General that habeas relief has been denied or that the time to
file a petition for habeas relief has expired? Section 53.1-232.1 further
requires that the execution date be no later than sixty days after the hearing
date.4 Sheppard claimed that the statute violated his Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to equal protection in the following two ways: (1) by truncat-
ing the time otherwise afforded to file a petition for certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court; and (2) by permitting capital petitioners less time to
seek certiorari from the Supreme Court than non-capital petitioners.5
Because death row inmates are not a suspect class for equal protection
purposes,6 and because inmates have no constitutional right to petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari,7 the court reviewed section 53.1-232.1 under
a rational basis standard. Thus, the court reasoned that the statute was
constitutional so long as the Commonwealth was seeking to advance a
legitimate goal and "it was reasonable for lawmakers to believe that the use
of the challenged classification would further that purpose."8 Because the
court found the Commonwealth's interests in the finality of criminal
judgments and in executing sentence on "the most serious offenders" to be
legitimate, and because the truncated filing period furthered these legitimate
goals, Sheppard's first claim was denied.9 Similarly, the court decided that
because death row inmates (unlike non-capital inmates) benefit from delay
1. 168 F.3d 689 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-232.1 (Michie 1999).
3. Sheppard v. Early, 168 F.3d 689, 691 (4th Cir. 1999).
4. Id. at 692.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 1989)).





in the review process, the Commonwealth was justified in treating them
differently and expediting the review process.' The court did not explain
how giving capital inmates less process than non-capital inmates comports
with the need for increased reliability in a sentence of death acknowledged
by the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina."
Matthew L. Engle
10. Id. at 693.
11. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that a North Carolina statute
that mandated a death sentence for a broad category of offenses was unconstitutional).
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